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NATO, MBFR and Some Related Issues

Study Number 1

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
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The problem was to analyze selected political, strategic, and tactical current issues confronting the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance has been the backbone of American defense alliances since 1949. It has undergone several political, strategic, and tactical changes since its inception. Currently, it is in the process of undergoing another series of changes in all three fields. These fields are quite necessarily interrelated and cannot be dealt with in a vacuum. This study attempts to tie the above issues together. In this process the interrelationship between political, strategic, and tactical decisions becomes apparent.

Chapter one deals with the background and issues surrounding MBFR. It concludes that by some means an eventual US troop reduction from Europe is probably inevitable and presents some of the proposals which have been advanced to defend Europe with fewer men.

Chapters two and three deal with two of these proposals - the adoption of a short war strategy and reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Chapter two concludes that, in spite of some inherent problems, a short war strategy should be adopted by the US and NATO so as to try and limit the possibility of escalation to the utilization of nuclear weapons. Chapter three concludes that the tactical nuclear weapon issue in Central Europe is very complex and is probably not going to be resolved in the near future in either MBFR or SALT.

Chapter four ties all of the preceding analyses together. It examines the rationale behind the changes in tactical doctrine and organization which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is now undergoing. In the process of doing this it is observed that the high mobility of the emerging tank-heavy FRG force structure is ideally suited for a short war. The combat service support is being centralized or assigned to the territorial forces so as to increase the tooth-to-tail ratio. Tactical units have been made smaller so as to be more mobile and easier to control. The tactical doctrine for the defense has undergone some drastic changes which are also compatible with a short war strategy. The FRG plans on defending well forward. They do not plan on giving up terrain and appear to be willing to accept encirclement. Their defense is characterized by audacity and mobility. They plan on conducting mobile warfare where units - platoon to brigade sized - are quickly shifted on the battlefield to deal with threats and then returned to their defensive positions. They plan on using their mobility as a combat multiplier while attriting an enemy force. This concept is entirely compatible with a short war strategy which attempts to win the first battle so that conflict control and termination can be achieved at the negotiating table.

The study concludes that a short war strategy should be adopted by the US and its NATO allies. Accompanying this strategic change should be an organizational one. The FRG example is a good starting point for analysis. These changes should allow a conflict in Europe to stay nonnuclear. The German tactics and organization are fitted to either a nuclear or nonnuclear conflict. There are some potential problems in the German tactics, but their use of mobility has much to commend it.

Introduction

The following chapters have been written to present and analyze some of the current political strategic and tactical issues with which the NATO alliance is now confronted.

The chapters that follow are separate entities but are also interrelated. The first chapter deals with the background and issues surrounding Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). It concludes with a presentation of some of the proposals that have been made for the defense of NATO with fewer men. The subsequent chapters deal with several of these proposals. Chapter 2 deals with the proposal that NATO adopt a "short war" strategy rather than a "long war" strategy. Chapter 3 deals with MBFR and SALT and the tactical nuclear weapons question and its relationship to the "long war" versus "short war" debate presented in chapter 2. Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the doctrine, tactics and force structure and their rationale, that one country - The Federal Republic of Germany - has adopted as part of her "short war" strategy. This effort will then conclude with some general observations on the four chapters.

Chapter 1

MBFR: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

On 31 October 1973 the formal discussions of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)¹ in Europe began in Vienna. This was the result of five years of discussions within and between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. An MBFR agreement may have a profound effect on the United States Armed Forces. Therefore, with these talks getting underway, it will be useful to examine the environment within which these negotiations are taking place in order to try and determine possible outcomes from an MBFR agreement. This paper will briefly do this by examining the background of MBFR, to include: the motives of the differing participants in the MBFR negotiations, the NATO alliance problems, and the negotiating difficulties inherent in reaching an MBFR agreement. This examination of the background of MBFR will allow some speculation on possible outcomes. These possible outcomes will be linked to some doctrinal and force changes that have been suggested in order to see what the implications of an MBFR agreement may be for the United States military.

MBFR surfaced in the 1968 NATO Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik. It had its origins in the Harmel Report as one of

several means to promote detente.² It went unanswered by the Warsaw Pact until after the Rome Ministerial meeting of 1970. The Warsaw Pact showed an inclination to discuss the reduction of "foreign" armed forces in response to the NATO proposal which called for both foreign and indigenous troops and weapons to be reduced.³ The true signal of willingness and readiness to negotiate was transmitted by General Secretary Brezhnev in his speech to the 24th Party Congress and his Tiflis speech.⁴ These speeches came on the eve of the 1971 NATO Ministerial meeting in Lisbon which looked at the question in depth.⁵ As a result of the 1971 NATO Ministerial meeting, the NATO countries began giving the subject of MBFR serious consideration. After a series of informal and formal negotiations, the Warsaw Pact agreed to enter into MBFR negotiations in exchange for U.S. participation in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

Motives for MBFR Negotiations

The Nixon administration has given two formal motives for MBFR. "Our objective in MBFR is -- and will continue to be -- a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces."⁶ "This is also a year in which we are seeking to negotiate a mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces in Europe which will reduce our defense budget and allow us to have funds for other purposes at home so desperately needed."⁷ Neither of these administration reasons are to argue that MBFR negotiations do not offer the administration at least a

temporary alternative to a unilateral force reduction as a result of Congressional action on one of the annual "Mansfield Resolutions," which call for a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe.⁸ Mansfield's rationale for a unilateral reduction of forces from Europe illustrates some other possible motives that the United States may have for MBFR negotiations.⁹ Senator Mansfield has argued that the nations of Western Europe are financially able to assume a greater percentage of the costs of the common defense.¹⁰ It has been reported that the United States troop commitment to NATO resulted in a "net U.S. military balance of payments deficit with NATO Europe of \$1.47 billion."¹¹ It is also estimated that "the incremental budgetary costs of stationing U.S. troops in NATO Europe will amount to \$440 million in fiscal year 1974."¹² The Nixon administration sees the MBFR negotiations as a means of reducing these costs. It also sees the U.S. forces in Europe as a negotiating advantage in its talks with the Common Market countries on trade, investment and monetary arrangements.¹³ Senator Mansfield has also argued that the U.S. would gain increased military flexibility if her troops in Europe were stationed in the United States.¹⁴ This became evident during the most recent Middle-East conflict. The European members of NATO were fearful of an interruption in their oil supplies by the Arab oil states if they supported Israel or the United States. For this reason, they denied the United States the right to use U.S. bases on

their territory for the resupply of Israel and protested when U.S. forces stationed in Germany were alerted for possible utilization in the Middle-East.¹⁵ This combination of actions and lack of diplomatic support has strained US-NATO relations.¹⁶ From this one can postulate a motive of the United States as being the desire to increase military flexibility by reducing the number of troops tied down in Europe.

The motives for entering into MBFR negotiations by the European NATO nations were varied. As pointed out earlier, the Harmel Report offered MBFR as a means of promoting detente. Senator Mansfield and his Senate resolutions for unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe¹⁷ were also probably a driving force among the NATO nations who fear a unilateral force reduction because they perceive "the grave political effects it would have in the East as well as in the West."¹⁸ These grave effects are a "step toward, well, more or less, Soviet hegemony, as far as Europe is concerned."¹⁹ This argument by Schmidt and Brandt is predicated on the belief that Europe would not increase her financial outlays for defense, that even the combined British and French nuclear deterrent, without U.S. forces in Europe to serve as a "trip wire," would not be credible.²⁰ The European solution to this problem that a unilateral reduction of forces might create became negotiations on MBFR.

Others have argued that MBFR would provide cost reductions for all the nations involved while the disarmers felt

that lower troop levels would reduce the probability of violent conflict. Others have hoped that MBFR might impose on the Soviet Union limitations which would make future Czechoslovakias more difficult.²¹

It is interesting to note that an argument can be made that Western European motives for becoming involved in MBFR negotiations are at least a partial attempt to preclude a U.S. unilateral reduction and possibly to defuse some of the other motives that the United States has for MBFR. It will now be useful to look at the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations' motives before analyzing the negotiations themselves.

The Soviet Union's motives for MBFR probably revolve around their desired gains from detente, such as increased trade with the West; the Chinese military threat along their common Asian border; a reduction of U.S. influence in Western Europe while maintaining their position of hegemony in Eastern Europe; and a lower ceiling on the size of the Bundeswehr. They also probably hope to reduce American "forward based systems," which was a non-negotiable issue in SALT.²² (The forward based system situation was mentioned while discussing Western European motives and will be addressed again later as some have argued that they are a critical component in the MBFR negotiations).

To the extent that the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies have motives which are at variance to the Soviet Union's,

they, like NATO, probably hope to remove or reduce Soviet presence and thus her freedom of action in Eastern Europe. This may confront the Soviet Union with at least a partial dilemma. As mentioned, she hopes to reduce U.S. influence in Western Europe. To do this, she may have to agree to some type of force reduction in Eastern Europe. Thus, to the extent that her position of hegemony in Eastern Europe is dependent on her forces there, she will suffer a reduction in influence in Eastern Europe in exchange for the reduction in U.S. influence in Western Europe. The obvious question then is which is more important to her. The answer to this question may have an impact on the type of outcome that results from the MBFR negotiations.

Having briefly explained the motives of the participants in the MBFR negotiations, it will now be useful to look at the mission of NATO, the comparative force structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the evolution of NATO strategic doctrine before turning to the negotiating difficulties inherent in reaching an MBFR agreement.

Comparative Force Structures

In order to understand the difficulties of reaching a negotiated agreement on force reductions and to be able to deal with some of the doctrinal and force structure changes which may result from an agreement, it is first necessary to compare forces.²³

MANPOWER

Ground Forces Including Marines* (in thousands)

	World-Wide	Central Europe	Warsaw Pact	World-Wide	Central Europe
United States	998	190	Soviet Union	2,067	430
Britain	194	55	Czechoslovakia	150	150
Canada	33	3	East Germany	90	90
Belgium	65	65	Poland	201	201
Netherlands	73	72			
West Germany	334	334			
	1,697	719			
France	332	58			
Totals	2,029	777	Totals	2,508	871

*Active Forces Only

FORMATIONS

In Central Europe

NATO

	Divs			Indep bdes/regts		
	Armd	Mech	Other	Armd	Mech	Other
United States	2	2	--	2	1	--
Britain	2	--	--	--	--	--
Canada	--	--	--	--	1	--
Belgium	--	1	--	1	-	1
Netherlands	--	--	--	2	4	--
West Germany	4	6	2	2	-	--
	8	9	2	7	6	1
France	--	2	--	--	--	--
Totals	8	11	2	7	6	1

Warsaw Pact

	Armd divs		Mech divs		Other divs		Indep bdes/regts	
	Category*		Category*		Category*		Category*	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Soviet Union	14	-	13	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	5	-	3	2	-	-	1	-
East Germany	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	5	-	6	2	2	-	-	-
Totals	26	-	26	4	2	-	1	-

*Category 1 is between 3/4 and full strength with full equipment.
 Category 2 is between 1/2 and 3/4 strength with complete fighting vehicles.

MAIN BATTLE TANKS (A)

In Central Europe			
NATO	Formation holding	Warsaw Pact	Formation holding
United States (B)	2,100	Soviet Union	6,850
Britain	600	Czechoslovakia	2,500
Canada	30	East Germany	1,350
Belgium	300	Poland	3,100
Netherlands	450		
West Germany	2,950		
	6,430		
France	325		
Totals	6,755	Totals	13,800

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

In Central Europe			
NATO	Squadron holding	Warsaw Pact	Squadron holding
United States	230	Soviet Union	1,250
Britain	130	Czechoslovakia	500
Canada	50	East Germany	320
Belgium	140	Poland	700
Netherlands			
West Germany			
	1,220		
France	500		
Totals	1,720	Totals	2,770

A Tanks with or for operation units. Reserve or replacement tanks not included.

B Including approximately 750 stockpiled for dual-based and immediate reinforcing formations.

Theater Nuclear Weapons & Delivery Systems¹

	US	USSR
Warheads	7,000	3,500
IRBM, SRBM		
Cruise Missiles		
Unguided Rockets	750	1,600
Arty	408 ²	Not Available
Aircraft	1,300 ²	1,300 ²

1. These figures are not exact or complete due to the nonavailability of data.

2. These aircraft would not all necessarily carry nuclear weapons.

NOTE: NATO was formed in 1949 in response to a perceived threat from the Soviet Union towards Western Europe. The 1962 NATO publication, NATO Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization States:

"The North Atlantic Treaty is essentially a framework for very broad co-operation between its signatories. It is not only a military alliance formed to prevent aggression -- or to repel it should the need arise; it also provides for joint permanent action in the political economic and social fields." The forces shown in above charts are thus designed to deter an attack by Warsaw Pact and to defend Western Europe.

NATO Strategy

One needs to remember that counting troops and comparing them is at best a difficult task due to differences in organizations, equipment and other intangibles such as morale, training and weather. Alan Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith have argued that a "rough parity" can be said to exist in the Central European theater.²⁴ This term "rough parity" is used here to denote a situation where neither side has such a superiority of conventional arms as to be tempted to try a limited conventional attack. This then would mean that "flexible response" may still be a viable strategy for NATO. However, the charts show a Warsaw Pact advantage in manpower, divisions, main battle tanks and tactical aircraft. The United States has an advantage only in tactical nuclear weapons. This should further illustrate why the forward based systems consideration mentioned earlier may be of critical importance to the Soviet Union. It also illustrates why the United States' NATO allies may be fearful of losing the US nuclear deterrent or at least the credibility of that deterrent. The United States' 4 1/3 divisions thus would not appear to constitute an irreplaceable force until one considers that nuclear option that their presence implies, the political influence which their presence may provide the United States, and the regional stability which may result.²⁵

NATO, in its twenty-five years of existence, has gone through three strategic doctrines. The current doctrine of

"flexible response" is briefly mentioned above. These three strategic doctrines were briefly related to the tactical nuclear weapon superiority, noted above, by Professor Kuenne when he stated:

NATO's strategy for using this superiority has evolved through three ill-defined phases. During the massive retaliation era, tactical weapons were to be used as supplements to strategic weapons; in 1954, NATO commanders were authorized to use them regardless of the enemy's initial weapon's choice. In 1967, NATO duly endorsed the Kennedy administration's reliance on a strong conventional component of "flexible response." Finally, although flexible response remains NATO policy, recent administration statements have reemphasized the tactical nuclear option, presumably to deter the USSR and to hasten detente.²⁶

The type of strategy and doctrine that NATO adopts after MBFR is an important consideration which will be dealt with at the end of this paper. The comparative force levels, the NATO doctrines, and the motives for MBFR which have already been discussed should make it obvious that the successful negotiation of a withdrawal is not without numerous problems which will have to be overcome.

Intra-NATO Problems

One of the problems associated with MBFR is the resolution of disagreements between the United States and its NATO allies. These disagreements include the US position in the most recent Middle-East conflict, the possibility of a US unilateral reduction of forces, and the several economic issues which have caused friction between the United States and Europe.

During the recent Middle-Eastern conflict, Europe was fearful of an interruption of her oil supplies by the Arab oil states if she supported Israel or the United States. For this reason, they denied the United States the right to use US bases on their territory for the resupply of Israel and protested when US forces stationed in Germany were alerted for possible utilization in the Middle-East.²⁷ This combination of actions and the lack of diplomatic support has strained US-NATO relations.²⁸ This potential loss of flexibility on the possible uses of US forces in Europe has also raised questions in some American military circles.

As noted earlier, the Mansfield resolutions in the US Senate have raised the spectre of a unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Europe. This possibility has also been raised by Senator Nunn who spoke of cutting support troops in Europe by 20,000 to 90,000.²⁹ Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has also talked about a 20,000 man unilateral reduction.³⁰ These proposals are sure to have further worried the United States' NATO allies. These types of proposals also raise doctrinal type questions which will have to be addressed in the latter portions of this paper.

The rationale for Senator Mansfield's resolutions also has raised the economic issues that beset US-European Relations. These revolve around trade, investment, and monetary arrangements at one level and economic burden sharing for defense and "offset payments" at another level. These levels have

been linked by the use of the threat of a possible unilateral American withdrawal of forces in order to gain favorable, to the US, resolution of both types of economic issues. The economic issues and the political issues of European-Arab relations are thus linked together by the threat of a unilateral force reduction. This will effect the on-going process of deciding on a NATO position on the issues that are raised in the negotiations. These intra-NATO negotiations will be occurring while NATO is involved in the serious MBFR discussions with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The interaction between these two sets of negotiations may therefore make an MBFR agreement more difficult to achieve. In addition to the intra-NATO problems, one can imagine the intra-governmental negotiations that have and are going on within the United States government at this time. John Newhouse, in his book Cold Dawn,³¹ discusses the intricate negotiations which went on within the US security agencies in order to reach an agreed upon negotiating position for the United States in SALT. It should not take too much imagination to expect a similar situation to result with regard to MBFR, with the Army being particularly recalcitrant because of the size of the forces it could lose if the MBFR negotiations resulted in a withdrawal and demobilization of a large number of Army troops.

Having examined the motives for MBFR, the comparative force structures, and the intra-NATO problems, this paper

will now turn to other difficulties of negotiating some kind of mutual force reduction in Europe. Having examined the problems of negotiating an agreement, the respective positions will be presented. This paper will then look at the possible outcomes and their implications.

Negotiating Problems

During the 1970 NATO Ministerial meeting in Rome, a set of negotiating criteria were produced which General Secretary Brezhnev is said to have accepted in his Oreanda talks with Chancellor Brandt. These are,³²

1. Mutual Force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations;
2. Reductions should be on a basis of reciprocity, and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing;
3. Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapon systems in the area concerned;
4. There must be adequate verifications and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions.

These criteria are unexceptionable, but applying them may be quite another matter. The following considerations extracted from President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to the Congress of 3 May 1973³³ should illustrate the complexity of these criteria:

- Reductions provide an inherent advantage for the side that has postured its forces along offensive lines; offensive forces would retain the initiative to concentrate and attack, while the defense must continue to defend the same geographical front with fewer forces.
- Major deployments of equipment, especially those with offensive capabilities, are therefore an important element in the reduction process.
- How can equivalence be established between different categories of equipment? What ratios would be equitable?
- Mixed, asymmetrical reductions. This means reductions would be made by different amounts in various categories of weapons or manpower. It could prove extremely complex to define equivalence between different weapons systems.
- How do we reconcile reductions in roughly balanced conventional forces with the fact that the strategic balance is no longer clearly favorable to the Alliance?
- What are the capabilities to sustain a conventional defense of NATO territory with reduced forces?
- Could a substantial reduction in conventional defense lead to a greater or earlier reliance on nuclear weapons?
- Can reduced forces be maintained and improved in the present political environment?
- What would be the net effect of a new balance in Central Europe on the flanks of NATO?
- How would reductions affect the relative burdens of American and European forces?

In addition, there is the question of how nuclear weapons will be discussed, i.e., the whole forward based system argument and the definition of which weapons are to be considered strategic that came up in SALT.³⁴ An agreement on the means of verification is also potentially a sticky question that will have to be resolved, in spite of the negotiating criteria noted above.³⁵

Possible MBFR Outcomes

The preceding discussion provides the framework to try and determine what the possible results of the MBFR negotiations will be. There are basically two possible outcomes. (Assuming that there is an outcome other than a continuation

of negotiations ad infinitum). There can either be an equal percentage reduction or an unequal percentage reduction. Either of these outcomes may have qualitative provisions attached. In order to explain these types of outcome, it will be useful to use the publicly announced positions of the two sides.

On 16 September 1973, Drew Middleton, referencing "authoritative sources" and "high NATO sources" reported the proposal that NATO would make in the talks. It included the following: NATO and the Warsaw Pact would cut their forces to 700,000 men (an unequal percentage reduction of 10% for NATO and 20% for the Warsaw Pact). This reduction would be phased over several years and would include 28,500 American Army troops and 3,000 airmen in exchange for 67,500 Soviet personnel which would include a large proportion of armor units.³⁶ This proposal is for an unequal percentage reduction and includes qualitative provisions for the USSR but not for the US.

The USSR has been pushing for an equal percentage reduction of each alliance's forces -- excluding the US and USSR -- in addition to the US and USSR reductions. This is probably a result of their motive, noted earlier, of wanting to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr. The USSR also has insisted that nuclear and air forces be included in reductions along with ground forces.³⁷ This is also probably a result of the motives noted earlier.

Based on the above public reports of the negotiating positions of the two sides and the previously discussed motives and negotiating problems there are some conclusions that can be drawn as to the most likely result of the MBFR negotiations. Due to the asymmetrical nature of the troops involved and the geographical distances that the troops will have to be withdrawn, it becomes very likely that any reduction will be an unequal percentage one. The Soviet insistence on the reduction of US nuclear forces and the US desire to reduce Soviet armored formations makes it seem likely that there will be qualitative provisions in the agreement. This, when coupled with the inspection and verification problems, probably means that the reductions will take the form of entire units being withdrawn. The US's Western European allies' insistence that the US nuclear shield be maintained will also probably mean that the number of tactical nuclear weapons that are withdrawn in the first phase will only be of a token nature. It also seems likely that there will be a taken reduction of the forces of the other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This conclusion seems apparent as the result of the differences between the size of the US and USSR contingents that are to be withdrawn and the 700,000 man ceiling in the US proposal. (It should be noted, however, that the Warsaw Pact is highly unlikely to accept a common ceiling for the two Alliances. It does seem likely that they will have to accept some type of unequal percentage agreement if

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there is to be an agreement at all. This conclusion is based on the motives of the participants which were discussed earlier.) This would also allow some compromise with the Soviets who desire a reduction in the size of the Bundeswehr.

The most likely result of the MBFR negotiations, based on the preceding information and analysis, would thus seem to be one that is of an unequal percentage nature which includes qualitative provisions. The first phase of these reductions will include a predominate percentage of US and USSR forces, though there will be a token reduction of the other alliance partners' forces.

If the resultant negotiated agreement does in fact follow the general outline presented above, the United States will only reduce her forces in Europe by approximately 30,000. This may not be enough to appease Senator Mansfield and it will probably not have a significant impact on US balance of payments deficits or the size of the military budget. It will go a long way towards temporarily appeasing the United States' NATO allies and thus may provide an impetus for a renewal of the intra-alliance negotiations that were discussed earlier.

The final portion of this paper will deal with some of the suggestions that have been made with regard to the post-MBFR NATO defense posture. These suggestions are important as they raise the type of considerations that the United States and her NATO allies will have to deal with in the

future and should start considering today.

Implications of an MBFR Agreement

Dealing with reductions in the NATO forces is a subject that has drawn much comment in the last several years. Many authors are concerned with what NATO should do in response to a US unilateral reduction of forces or a negotiated reduction. These cover more than the conclusion on the nature of the reduction which seems most likely that was discussed in the previous section of this paper. In most cases these proposals were not linked to specific types of outcomes. To determine what the military impact of any type of force reduction from Europe might be, it will be useful to consider the proposals that have been made. This will be done by a brief survey of the literature. These proposals can be divided into three categories for simplicity. These categories are (1) Reorganization of those forces remaining in Europe; (2) Procurement of New Weapon Systems and; (3) New Strategies and/or Doctrines. In several cases the advocates of a proposal which falls into one category also have recommendations in other categories. These categories are also not all inclusive.

Kenneth Hunt has presented six different reorganization models which will allow Europe to be defended with fewer men.³⁸ His first is "Restructuring," which is a "reorganization of units and formations to give more initial defensive strength, and thus more flexibility."³⁹ Second is "Rapid Reinforcement in Crisis," which envisions the rapid return

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of withdrawn American forces in crisis situations. This is somewhat of an expanded dual-basing concept. This third model is "More Reliance on Reservists," which envisions cadre divisions which are able to be rapidly brought up to combat strength in time of need. Fourth is a "Simple Reduction" which calls for the US troops which are not reduced not to be replaced. Model five envisions "US Forces in Reserve" which makes the US forces the central mobile theater reserve. Hunt's sixth, and final model, is "Defense in Depth." This model calls for the integration of territorial forces-militia-and active units so as to achieve a smaller active force. Hunt also points out, as should be obvious, that these models are not mutually incompatible. Others have stressed proposals similar to some of these and in many cases have provided more detail.

The idea of utilization of territorial forces to flesh out the deployed troops has also been proposed by Wyle,⁴⁰ Komer,⁴¹ and Menderhausen.⁴² The proposal here is to have light militia organizations in a screening and delaying mission across the front. These would be backed up by conventional forces which would reinforce in a major confrontation.

The idea of restructuring has also been talked about by Josua,⁴³ Kuenne,⁴⁴ and Heisenberg⁴⁵ with regard to nuclear weapons. They each advocate force restructuring and an increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as a means of deterring a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. They each

hope to gain or encourage crisis stability by their integration of US and European nuclear forces. This, needless to say, also has doctrinal implications which will be dealt with later.

Others, such as Komer,⁴⁶ Nunn,⁴⁷ and Canby⁴⁸ advocate a reduction in the NATO support elements (especially US support units) as a means of increasing combat strength. The idea is to increase the teeth-to-tail ratio by going from a long war to a short war configuration. The concept here is that any Warsaw Pact invasion will be a violent blitzkrieg type of attack, which must be stopped initially. Once it is stopped then negotiations or escalation will take place. In this type of scenario, these authors see a need for all combat power forward and a reduced ability to "last." They gain this increased combat strength by substituting combat units for support units. (This concept may be under revision in light of the Israeli and Arab experience during the Yom Kippur War.)

Each of these organization proposals has, at least, doctrinal implications while some of them have formal doctrinal recommendations. Robert Komer, Senator Nunn and Steven Canby⁴⁹ have argued that the United States and NATO should adopt a short war orientation, as was mentioned above. Canby states "a military force structured for a short war can usually fight a long war if necessary, provided that long lead items are hedged and the economic resources are

available.⁵⁰ The concept of using an integrated tactical nuclear weapon force as a means of defending Europe means that doctrinally we have come nearly full circle and are again making Bernard Brodie's⁵¹ arguments of the late 1950's and early 1960's that it is cheaper and more desirable to rely on tactical nuclear weapons, rather than conventional forces, to defend Europe. The idea of using territorial militia as a forward screen would seem to mean a defense in depth, not a "forward defense" concept as is now envisioned by NATO strategists. These doctrinal recommendations are thus not necessarily compatible with "flexible response," but as R.C. Richardson points out, it may be a long time before NATO can fashion a new strategy and it had at least better start thinking about this now.⁵²

The final category of proposals for change is "new weapons." Cliffe has argued that those future weapons which are procured should require fewer men to operate them and should not be overly sophisticated so that reservists can learn to operate them quickly.⁵³ He, like Lord Gladwyn,⁵⁴ places his primary interest on anti-armor weapons other than the tank. Lord Gladwyn also stresses widespread utilization of anti-tank minefields. He also has a reorganization proposal which calls for the creation of small anti-armor mobile groups.

The second group within those calling for new weapons are those that advocate a new family of tactical nuclear

weapons. They want less vulnerable nuclear forces and have already been discussed.

Conclusion

The preceding several pages of discussion are not related to any specific MBFR outcome. The precise outcome of the MBFR negotiations may invalidate some of these proposals. For example, if qualitative provisions such as the number of battalions are part of any agreement, it will then be very difficult to transform units from being support units to being combat units. The same type of argument can also be made with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. The US position noted earlier seems to take this type of argument into consideration as far as US units are concerned but not as far as Soviet units are concerned.

It should be obvious that there are numerous possible responses or combinations of responses that can be selected from the above in order to allow NATO to perform its deterrence and defense roles in a post-MBFR Europe. It would be presumptuous of me to try and conclude what that response should be. Suffice to say that there are numerous possibilities and the United States and NATO should begin considering the different combinations of possibilities now before the MBFR outcome, which has been predicted, or some other, comes to pass.

All of the previous discussion illustrates that post-MBFR Europe will continue to have an Atlantic-Alliance with the

United States being an active participant in terms of political and military commitment. It also shows that defense issues such as force size, and structure and the interaction between military strategy and political considerations, will continue to occupy the time and energies of numerous politicians, defense analysts and diplomats in the East and West. Motives, military forces, and strategic doctrines may change, but the issues of intra and inter-bloc relations will continue. This paper has attempted to put these type of issues in context and to show their interrelationships so that the reader can appreciate them, now and in the future, and their implications for the United States military.

END NOTES

1. It should be noted that MBFR can also be referred to as MFR (Mutual Force Reductions) as the US agreed to drop the Balanced from the title while maintaining the concept of Balanced in the discussions. The Formal title is now Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MURFAAMCE).
2. Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, NATO Information Service, Brussels 1968. There are historical antecedents in several arms control and disengagement concepts that were under discussion in the 1950's and 60's. The Gomulka and Rapacki plans are two examples.
3. Survival, August 1970, pp. 279-282.
4. It is interesting that Brezhnev's Tiflis speech came just as the Senate was preparing to vote on the "Mansfield Amendment." Some commentators have argued that this might have been intentional. For discussions of this, see a series of articles in the L.A. Times on 15, 16 and 17 May 1971.
5. Survival, Sept 1971, pp. 315-318.
6. Secretary of Defense, Eliot L. Richardson's, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1974, p. 22.
7. R.M. Nixon, "The Watergate Speech," 30 April 1973, as printed in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXXIX., #15, dtd 15 May 1973.
8. The Mansfield resolutions in the Senate have raised the spectre of a unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Senator Mansfield's argument for a unilateral reduction of US troops is based on several propositions. First, the nations of Western Europe are financially able to shoulder a greater burden of the common defense; second, the credibility of the American commitment to the defense of Europe does not depend "on an excessive and antiquated United States deployment in Europe" and; third, in case of need, American troops could be ferried by air to Europe in short order. On each of these points there is argument pro and con as to their validity. What is important about the Mansfield resolutions is that they are made each year and seem to be more popular with each successive attempt at Congressional passage and thereby worry the United States' NATO allies. It might even be argued that Senator Mansfield may have additional support in the House of Representatives,

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in addition to the Senate, the next time out in light of the NATO nations' actions during the Middle-East conflict. This may be especially true if he modifies the assumption underlying the statement that money can be saved by withdrawing some US forces from Europe. He does not say whether this is balance-of-payments monies or budgetary monies, but the implication is that it is both. For further discussion of this, see Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Allies Seeking to Dissuade U.S. from Sudden Cut in Troops," N.Y. Times, 13 June 1973. Hans J. Morgenthau, "US Forces Shield or Symbol?", The L.A. Times, 25 Feb 1970. Bernard Gwertzman, "Troop Cutback in Europe is Voted by Senate Panel," N.Y. Times, 18 Nov 1971, and David Binder, "Mansfield Asks Troop Cut Again," N.Y. Times, 26 July 1973. As "the dates of the articles referenced in this Footnote should illustrate, the Mansfield Resolutions have been appearing every year.

9. See Footnote 8 for a discussion of Mansfield's Rationale.

10. See Footnote 8.

11. This \$1.47 billion is after \$696 million of off-set purchases have been made by the NATO nations. "US Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons," a staff report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2 December 1973, p. 3.

12. Ibid. p. 4.

13. President Nixon's Press Conference of 15 and 19 March 1974, as reported in the N.Y. Times of 16 and 20 March 1974.

14. See Footnote 8.

15. Flora Lewis, "Tracing American-Allied Clash: Events Outpaced the Attitudes," N.Y. Times, 13 Nov 1973, p. 16.

16. In addition to the article referenced in Footnote Number 15, the reader should also look at: David Bender and Alvin Shuster, "Nixon says some Allies Failed US on Middle-East," N.Y. Times, 27 Oct 1973, p. 1, and Alvin Shuster, "Europeans Irked by US Complaints," N.Y. Times, 30 Oct 1973, p. 14.

17. See Footnote 8.

18. Helmut Schmidt, the German Defense Minister, as quoted in the Washington Post, April 2 1970. (Helmut Schmidt is now the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.)

19. Willy Brandt in an interview on Meet the Press, April 12, 1970, as quoted and referenced by John Newhouse et al. in U.S. Troops in Europe, p. 84.
20. Helmut Schmidt, "Germany in the Era of Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, October 1970, p. 42. Also see Malcom A. Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," in Klaus Knorr (ed) NATO and American Security, Chapter 5.
21. For a full discussion of MBFR's political aspects, see Christoph Bertram's, Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects, Adelphi Paper, Number 84, 1972.
22. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet motives, see Chapter 2 of John Newhouse's, US Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs and Choices. For another explanation of Soviet motives, see "European Security and the Nixon Doctrine," Report of a conference 21-22 April 1972. The Conference was held under the auspices of the International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School of Diplomacy. And for a discussion of Forward Based Systems and SALT, see Newhouse's Cold Dawn, pp. 174-76 and p. 271.
23. The Military Balance, 1973-74, pp. 91-95 and pp. 69-71 were used for all force data.
24. K. Wayne Smith and Alain C. Enthoven, How Much is Enough, Chap. 4.
25. Regional stability is achieved to the extent that a reduced American presence might cause the Germans either unilaterally or through some joint effort to acquire nuclear weapons. This possibility might raise all the anti-nuclear proliferation arguments and would certainly at least worry the Soviet Union.
26. R.E. Kuenne, "Our Military Posture in Europe," The Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1974, p. 16.
27. Flora Lewis, "Tracing American-Allied Clash: Events Outpaced Attitudes," N.Y. Times, 13 Nov 1973, p. 16.
28. In addition to the article referenced in Footnote Number 26, the reader should also look at: David Bender and Alvin Shuster, "Nixon Says Some Allies Failed U.S. on Middle-East," N.Y. Times, 27 Oct 1973, p. 1; 30 Oct 1973, p. 14.
29. "Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance," Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services US Senate, 2 April 1974.

30. John W. Finney, "US Weighs Trim in Europe Forces," N.Y. Times, 24 April 1974, p. 11.
31. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.
32. The Military Balance, 1972073, p. 18.
33. "Prospects for SALT II and MBFR," extracted by Survival in its Sept/Oct 1973 edition from President Nixon's Foreign Policy report to the Congress on 3 May 1973.
34. Newhouse, op. cit., Cold Dawn.
35. President Nixon in his "1972 State of the World Address," stated that the US could not unilaterally inspect for less than 10% reductions with any degree of assuredness and that 10% would have to be in closed Kasernes or unit departures not a thinning out of a unit.
36. Drew Middleton, "NATO Reported to Decide on Troop-Cut Offer to Soviet," N.Y. Times, 16 Sept 1973.
37. "Troop Talks in Vienna Inching Ahead," The N.Y. Times, 3 June 1974.
38. Kenneth Hunt, "The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defense With Fewer Men," Adelphi Paper, Number 98, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1973.
39. Ibid, p. 21. The following 4 models all come from the same page.
40. Frederick S. Wyle, "European Security: Beating the Numbers Game," Foreign Policy, Number 10, Spring 1973, pp. 41-54.
41. R.W. Komer, "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound," Foreign Policy, Number 13, Winter 1973-74, pp. 34-48.
42. H. Menderhausen, "Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe," The Rand Corporation, Feb 1973.
43. W. Joshua, "A Strategic Concept for the Defense of Europe," Orbis, Vol. XVII, Summer 1973, pp. 448-462.
44. R.E. Kuenne, "Our Military Posture in Europe," The Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1974, p. 16.
45. Wolfgang Heisenberg, "The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons," Adelphi Paper, Number 96, Summer 1973.
46. Komer, op. cit.

47. Senator Sam Nunn, "Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance," Report to the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 2 April 1974.
48. S.L. Canby, "NATO Muscle: More Shadow Than Substance," Military Review, Feb 1973.
49. Canby, Nunn and Komer, op. cit.
50. Canby, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
51. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, and "What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?" Reporter, 23 May 1963.
52. R.C. Richardson, "Can NATO Fashion a New Strategy?" Orbis, Vol. XVII, Summer 1973, pp. 415-438.
53. Trevor Cliffe, "Military Technology and the European Balance," Adelphi Paper Number 89, August 1972.
54. Lord Gladwyn, "The Defense of Western Europe," Foreign Affairs, April 1973, pp. 588-597.

Chapter 2

NATO STRATEGY

. . . there are two fundamental disagreements within NATO on conventional strategy. The first disagreement is on the amount of warning time NATO would have and the particular kind of Soviet attack that should be anticipated. The second disagreement is the length of time that NATO should plan to fight conventionally.¹

The above quote illustrates the problem of the interrelationship between warning time and the NATO strategy. It also raises the issue of whether NATO should have a "long war" or "short war" strategy. The adoption of a "short war" strategy was one of the recommendations made in the previous chapter for "treating NATO's self-inflicted wound" and defending Europe with fewer men in a post-MBFR environment. This chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the "long war - short war" debate. This analysis will define these two alternative strategies and then, by presenting the arguments for and against the adoption of a "short war" strategy, try and reach some conclusions as to which strategy would be the more advantageous for NATO.

Short War Strategy

A short war strategy is defined "as one that lasts less time than it would take for the protagonist's economy to be destroyed by a total disruption of its civilian society caused

by full utilization of all available resources by the nation's defense forces."² This definition is so broad and ambiguous that it does not provide the specificity needed for the purposes of this analysis. However, it does raise the critical issues of time and reliance on one's economy. In essence, a short war is one where a country's industrial base does not have an impact on the war after it has started. Senator Nunn, along with other analysts,³ feels that:

NATO should be prepared to fight conventionally for a relatively short time - measured in weeks. Their (the US's NATO allies) ammunition and supply stocks reflect this belief. The concept underlying this plan is that NATO should not prepare to crush the Red Army in a long conventional war that would destroy much of Western Europe, as in World War II. Rather, NATO should be prepared to fight very hard at the outset to stop any conventional attack on the border before it penetrated very far.⁴

A short war strategy for Europe is thus one of forward defense which is designed to initially stop an attack, using only the forces which are presently deployed, and force the Warsaw Pact to either negotiate, retire, or, possibly, escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. (The nuclear weapon issue will be looked at briefly later in this chapter and will be dealt with exclusively in Chapter 3.)

Long War Strategy

The long war strategists argue that a conventional conflict in Europe will be one of extended duration - more than 30 days. They also perceive a much longer warning time before hostilities actually begin. In essence, it might be somewhat

facetiously said that they perceive an armed conflict in Europe being another Second World War.

Threat Perceptions

The supporters of the different strategies partially base their positions on different views of the nature of a Warsaw Pact attack. The short war advocates perceive that the Pact would attack utilizing their forces in being after only a brief mobilization (measured in days), and would then use their other forces as follow-on echelons. This attack would have as its initial objective the Rhine River which would result in a grab of a large piece of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁶ (Less deep objectives such as Munich can also be easily imagined.) The long war advocates perceive that there would be several weeks of warning⁷ and that the attack would be characterized by "a succession of intensive efforts, interspersed with shorter periods devoted to resupply and relief of the attacking echelon."⁸

Relationship to Force Structure

The strategy adopted is critical for it determines, or at least should, how NATO configures its forces. The critical question is one of staying power. In a short war configuration, it is argued that there is a reduced need for logistical support units and that mobilizable reserves are not very applicable.⁹ "To state the problem starkly: If NATO continues to ignore its short run combat weaknesses, NATO's long run capabilities could be rendered useless by the Pact's initial onslaught."¹⁰

Critical Analysis

At this point, some of the basic differences between the two strategies should be apparent. It is thus now necessary to conduct a critical analysis of the short war strategy. This will be attempted to point out any weaknesses which it may have.¹¹ This analysis will be conducted with respect to three categories - conflict prevention, conflict control, and conflict termination.¹²

Conflict Prevention

Advocates of a short war strategy do not specifically deal with deterrence, though they do seem to make some assumptions in that regard. It can be postulated, however, that the increased conventional fighting capability which would result from a short war strategy, where the forces were configured to implement it, would cause the potential costs for the Pact, if they attacked, to increase. It would take more forces to make a penetration and thus the potential losses in conventional combat would be higher. (This assumes that the Pact could conduct a cost-benefit type of analysis where nuclear weapons would not be considered. This is a somewhat tenuous assumption because any time the US and USSR are directly involved, the specter of nuclear weapons is always raised. On the other hand, this assumption does have some utility for the purposes of analysis.) However, since the nuclear threshold would be higher, the overall losses suffered by the Pact might be lower. This is to argue that NATO's

perceived conventional inferiority in combat forces causes the Pact to consider NATO's nuclear and conventional capability simultaneously when projecting their potential overall losses in any attack in the central region. A case can probably be made that the Pact's losses in a tactical nuclear war would be higher than in a conventional war. Thus the ability to delay, or avoid, the utilization of nuclear weapons may reduce the overall deterrent effect which is achieved by NATO's current posture of perceived weakness. The Soviets seem to be currently anticipating that any conflict in Europe will be nuclear; though, they have just recently admitted that this is not the only possibility.¹³ If NATO's forces are structured with more combat forces forward, they may thus reduce the net deterrent effect of those forces. In short, there may be increased conflict prevention from mal-structured and mal-positioned forces, for they may decrease the Pact's ability to predict NATO's reaction. Another way of stating the point is that increased conventional capabilities may decrease NATO's credibility on whether or not she would use her tactical nuclear weapons and thus reduce NATO's overall deterrent effect.¹⁴ The above also raises some interesting considerations for conflict control.

Conflict Control

As noted above, an increased conventional capability may raise the nuclear threshold, but while doing this, it may reduce the overall deterrent effect of NATO's forces.

What if conflict prevention fails? One would then hope to control that conflict below the nuclear level and confine it to Central Europe. This would be accomplished by NATO not having to escalate to the utilization of nuclear weapons immediately. If the forward defense - short war strategy was successful in stopping a Pact attack, it would give them three alternatives. They could simply retire from the battlefield. They could negotiate. Or they could escalate to the utilization of nuclear weapons. The first two alternatives are very advantageous from NATO's perspective. The third, of course, is not. Would the Pact escalate? That is a critical question. Given their belief that the "side which first employs nuclear weapons with surprise can predetermine the outcome of the battle in his favor,"¹⁵ one might argue that they would escalate. It might also be argued that in the initial analysis of whether or not to attack, the possibility of escalation would have already been considered and accepted, but hopefully rejected. For example, by attacking conventionally and causing NATO to mass and defend conventionally, the Pact would have created the massed targets against which nuclear weapons would be very effective. In short, the Pact conventional attack could have been designed to create lucrative nuclear targets with the resulting "great expenditures of material, massive losses of troops and equipment."¹⁶

The above presupposes that a Pact attack is a calculated attempt to make territorial gains. However, if the attack was

the result of an accident, a short war strategy has the advantage of not necessitating escalation to nuclear weapons immediately so as to prevent the Pact from exploiting a fortuitous situation. If in a situation of accidental conflict the Pact foresaw an advantage to be gained, they might not stop their attacks. This might be the case in a situation where a substantial conventional capability was not in existence. The increased conventional capability would have thus assisted in raising the nuclear threshold and thus prevented an accidental conflict from escalating to nuclear war. The "pause" caused by the increased conventional capability is thus desirable in the case of an accidental conflict.

Even if the conflict stayed non-nuclear initially, the long war strategists fear that NATO would lose, or have to escalate because of a shortage of supplies. "The theory requires us to stop the enemy in his tracks with a conventional defense or, failing that, to fight to exhaustion of ammunition and supplies. Lacking resources, the price of failure is either to surrender or to escalate to tactical nuclear war."¹⁷ The short war advocates respond that "a military force structured for a short war can usually fight a long war if necessary, provided long lead time items are hedged and economic resources available", for "a scenario calling for a 90 day capability does not imply that the 91st day means defeat. Arguments implying such discontinuities usually have an emotional basis. In point of fact, items of support . . . do not end abruptly but either run down or are

An additional, but related, problem is the intensity of the probable hostilities. The 1973 Mid-East War demonstrated that there is a need for large levels of supply and a responsive logistical system to be able to support the fighting forces. If NATO's anticipated levels of supply expenditure are too low, it may be found that an expanded logistical capability is needed to fight a short war, let alone a long one. This recent experience may thus indicate that the support echelons in NATO now are necessary for a short war. This is to argue that an increased number of fighting units are of no use if they run out of POL and ammunition because of the high rates of their expenditure. This is a similar argument to General Polk's earlier argument, with one notable exception. The Pact is also organized for short, violent periods of conflict and thus the forces would be similarly organized¹⁹ and should be able to last similar periods. One thus needs to evaluate each support unit with the view of tailoring it for short term actions in support of the short war forces, if the reorganization for implementation of a short war strategy is begun. If this is the case, the arguments about tooth-to-tail ratios are irrelevant. It would be useful to look at the Israeli logistical system and the resulting tooth-to-tail ratio for a better understanding of short war logistical forces, but that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

In substance then, a short war strategy does have some favorable conflict control aspects, but it also has the potential

for causing escalation either in case of failure or success. This is a potential dilemma.

Conflict Termination

As mentioned above, a successful short war strategy would leave the Warsaw Pact with three options, two of which were desirable from the NATO perspective. It is this third option which is unattractive. Conflict termination would then take place when one side or the other stopped the escalation process and agreed to negotiate, or surrendered to the other's demands. The escalation process could also continue until one side was victorious or both were totally decimated. Hopefully, the hostilities would stabilize at some point and then be resolved by negotiations.²⁰ (It is interesting that few, if any analysts, deal with conflict termination once the escalation process has begun. They point to the need for the conflict to be stabilized so that negotiations can begin. The only reference to stopping the escalation is that both sides perceive the costs starting to exceed the potential benefits.²¹ This implies tacit bargaining and resulting restraint a la Thomas Schelling.²² This is an area that needs further analysis, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.)

It must be noted that the short war strategy does offer at least two non-escalatory means of conflict termination - negotiations after the blunting of a Pact attack well forward (stabilization) and a Pact retirement. If a short war strategy does not result in escalation to the utilization of the nuclear option, it can be said to have been successful in leading to 41

Conclusion

This critical analysis has attempted to show the difference between a short war strategy and a long war strategy for NATO. It has also attempted to illustrate some of the problems with both strategies with a principle focus on the short war strategy. One of the critical considerations was if NATO loses the short war, it will be unable to fight the conventional long war. This is not to say that there are not problems with a short war strategy. As has been shown, a short war strategy has certain problems in the areas of conflict prevention and conflict control when the question of nuclear weapons is introduced. Maybe there is an inherent conflict between war preventing strategies and war fighting strategies. Hopefully, the following chapter, which deals with an arms control proposal for Central Europe, when coupled with a short war strategy, will make conflict prevention, conflict control and conflict termination more easily attained.

In spite of the problems noted, the short war strategy still seems to be the more viable strategy for NATO. This, of course, does not mean that it can be sold in the political arena, but with a continuation of the studies being conducted at RAND, the Brookings Institute, and elsewhere, this may become possible.

End Notes

1. "Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance", Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Superintendent of Documents, US Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2 April 1974, p. 5.
2. Kenneth S. Brower, "Short War Defense Systems", Military Review, May 1973, p. 67.
3. Steven L. Canby, "Nato Military Policy: Obtaining Conventional Comparability with the Warsaw Pact", RAND Corp. R1088, Sept. 1972; and "NATO Muscle: More Shadow than Substance" printed in Foreign Policy, Number 8, Fall 1972 and Military Review, Feb. 1973. See also R.E. Komer's "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound" which was printed in Foreign Policy, Number 13, Winter 1973-74 and Military Review, August 1974.
4. Senator Sam Nunn, op. cit., p. 5.
5. General J. H. Polk, USA ret., "Force Reduction Options in Central Europe", Military Review, Oct. 1973, pp. 36-38. Also see Senator Sam Nunn, op. cit., p. 5.
6. R.I. Lawrence and J. Record, US Force Structure in NATO, an Alternative, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974, Chapter 2. This chapter has a good analysis which leads to the short warning time conclusion. Canby and Komer (see footnote 3) pretty much take this conclusion as a given.
7. Senator Sam Nunn, op. cit., p. 5.
8. General J.H. Polk, USA ret., op. cit., p. 37.
9. R.W. Komer, "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound", Military Review, August 1974, p. 56.
10. Steven L. Canby, "NATO Muscle: More Shadow than Substance", Military Review, Feb. 1973, p. 70.
11. This critical analysis approach has been adopted because the literature today is almost exclusively pro short war. This should be obvious from the references noted above. It is thus important that some of the problems, if there are any, of a short war strategy be highlighted so that future analysis can deal with them. (Hopefully my analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 will begin this process.)
12. For the purpose of this analysis, the following definitions will be used. Conflict prevention is defined as those actions which are taken to avoid the outbreak of armed hostilities. 43

Conflict control is defined as those actions which may prevent armed hostilities from expanding in the size of the geographical area of hostilities and/or the types of weapons utilized. Conflict termination is defined as those actions which are taken to cause armed hostilities to end.

13. A.A. Sidorenko. The Offensive, (A Soviet View), Translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, Superintendent of Documents, US Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973.

14. This of course assumes that NATO's deterrent effect can be written in some equation which consists of nuclear and conventional components, among others. An example might be,
 $D=f(S \times C1 + N \times C2 + \dots)$
 where D=Deterrence

S=Size Conventional Combat Forces

N=Nuclear Weapons

C=A measurement of the credibility of the type force under consideration

The validation of this function is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it does allow one to say than an increase in S coupled with a decrease in C2, with everything else constant, could result in a net reduction in deterrence.

15. Jeffrey Record, "To Nuke or not to Nuke", Military Review, Oct. 1974, p. 10, where he references A.A. Sidorenko as having written this statement. A brief review of Sidorenko did not reveal the exact quote, but its substance is throughout Chapter 2.

16. A.A. Sidorenko, op. cit., p. viii. Also see Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.

17. General J.H. Polk, USA ret., op. cit., p. 36. Also see Kenneth Hunt, "The Alliance and Europe: Part II Defense with Fewer Men", Adelphi paper, Number 98, Summer 1973, p. 33.

18. Steven L. Canby, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

19. Lawrence and Record, op. cit., Chapter 2.

20. It is interesting that Department of the Army Manual, October 1973 sees conflict termination as a process of conflict stabilization and then negotiations or escalations to "win" the war and thus terminate the conflict.

21. For example, see Paul Kecskemeti, "Political Rationality in Ending War" and William T.R. Fox, "The causes and conditions of War". Both articles are in the Nov. 1970 edition of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

22. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

Chapter 3

MBFR - SALT THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR QUESTION IN EUROPE

Tactical nuclear weapons should be the primary if not the exclusive means of defending Western Europe. The emergence of strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union has rendered suicidal any response to attack above the tactical nuclear level. Anything below it would be doomed to rapid defeat since NATO has never been able to muster a credible conventional defense and has little chance of doing so in the future.¹

The previous two chapters have raised in numerous ways the tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) question for the defense of Europe. Forward based systems and the tactical nuclear weapons have been used as a motive for European and Soviet participation in MBFR; a reason for the USSR to want a continued American presence in Europe; something to negotiate away in MBFR; a means of defending Europe with fewer men; and a strategy issue when evaluating a short war strategy in terms of conflict prevention, conflict control, and conflict termination. This chapter will address the tactical nuclear weapon question in the context of MBFR. This will be done by presenting an arms control proposal for negotiation in MBFR. This proposal will serve as a vehicle for illustrating the problems of reaching an arms control agreement on nuclear weapons in Europe. If these problems can be overcome, however, this proposal should serve useful for partially limiting the issues of escalation raised in chapter 2.

The Proposal

The principal aim of this proposal is one of conflict control. The proposal is to limit the type and range of the tactical nuclear weapon systems which are deployed in NATO's central region.² These weapon systems currently consist of aircraft with nuclear bombs, short range ballistic missiles, unguided rockets, and artillery. (See appendix 1 for the exact breakdown by country, type, and range.) It is proposed that MBFR initially be oriented towards reaching a freeze and then an elimination of all missile systems, which were not defined in SALT as strategic.³ This elimination would be in a 2,300 mile radius from Berlin (an arbitrary and negotiable location). The 2,300 mile figure was selected so as to include all Soviet land-based missiles short of ICBM's. In other words, there would be a missile free zone of 2,300 miles radius around Berlin. (See appendix 1 for data on the TNW's of NATO and the Pact.) The negotiation of this missile free zone in MBFR would not require the enlargement of the number of participants in the negotiations, except for France. All other European non-participants are signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and thus do not have nuclear warheads, and would probably only be marginally involved in a conflict in central Europe. This proposal would thus not include the French and British SLBM forces, but would include the French Pluton and the German Lance, etc.. There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to this proposal which will be dealt with. These should be

considered by the reader both in terms of the above proposal and the tactical nuclear weapons question in general.

Advantages

Bernard Brodie has argued that:

The use of any kind of nuclear weapons probably increases markedly the difficulties in the way of maintaining limitations on war. For one thing, it is much easier to distinguish between use and non-use of nuclear weapons than between the use of nuclear weapons below some arbitrary limit of size and use well above that limit. Their discontinuity in effects and in identification coincides with a moral feeling on the subject.⁴

Secretary of Defense McNamara argued that:

Nuclear weapons, even in the lower kiloton ranges, are extremely destructive devices and hardly the preferred weapons to defend such heavily populated areas as Europe. Furthermore, while it does not necessarily follow that the use of tactical nuclear weapons must inevitably escalate into global war, it does present a very definite threshold beyond which we enter a vast unknown.⁵

From these two quotes it would appear that once the nuclear threshold is passed, there is not another threshold short of total strategic nuclear war. The missile reduction proposal, however, is aimed at trying to establish a partial threshold. It is thought that by eliminating missile forces from Central Europe that the geographic area of even a tactical nuclear war in Europe would be restricted to the range of artillery, and of course, air delivered nuclear ordnance - which is still a problem, if geographic limits are sought. Since radar can differentiate between aircraft and missiles, and over the horizon radar can almost pinpoint the exact location of a missile launch⁶, the use of missiles would be an obvious escalatory measure. This should deal with missiles being fired from

locations within countries within the 2,300 mile radius who are not signatories to an agreement. An attack from there could be considered as an attack by the central actors. Given this, partial conflict control will have been achieved and conflict termination by negotiation should have become more feasible.

Aircraft were not included in the above proposal because of their dual nature - conventional and nuclear. This presents problems if one hopes to achieve a geographic limit to a conflict. The only response to this is that both sides have fairly extensive air defense networks which make aircraft more vulnerable to detection and destruction than missiles. This is especially true the deeper that they penetrate. For this reason, air strikes in depth, using nuclear weapons, would be an escalatory move, which signaled some degree of desperation on the side employing them, and thus a signal that some type of conflict stabilization is needed in order to avoid escalation to strategic weapon utilization. In short, an agreement which tried to reach a geographic limit on conflict would have been violated in sense if not in legal actuality by this air attack. This would allow both sides to reduce their fighter-bomber production costs because of the reduced range and sophistication required.⁷ These funds could be moved into air defense measures which would increase each sides population defense and thus reduce the potential damage to population centers in time of conflict.⁸

This missile reduction proposal is consistent with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's new targeting doctrine for the US's strategic nuclear forces.⁹ It would allow the US to use its CONUS based weapons systems to demonstrate resolve. However, with numeral parity as a result of the Vladivostok meetings¹⁰ the incentive to do so should be reduced. The use of the US CONUS based systems would demonstrate resolve, but it would also be a large step up the escalation ladder, which this proposal was desirous of avoiding. Possibly, however, if it is perceived as such, it would be avoided and some other form of conflict termination, such as negotiation, would be attempted rather than ride the nuclear escalation escalator in search of a "winning" strategy.

This proposal would allow the USSR to shift its SRBM force towards its borders with China and thus achieve increased deterrence against China with non "strategic"¹¹ weapons. The Chinese, however, might apply the Soviet's initial definition of strategic in SALT¹² and thus feel very threatened. This might tempt them to launch a preemptive attack. This movement to the East would also allow them to acquire a defense from afar against NATO offensive actions into Eastern Europe.

If NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to dismantle their tactical nuclear missile systems, this would free additional troop billets to be converted into conventional units and thus increase their conventional capability. This should

work to NATO's advantage as it can be argued that the Pact already has more forces than they can position on the Central European battlefield.¹³ The elimination of missile weapon systems would also limit the possible systems which could be used to deliver chemical munitions. This would be a positive step, which is compatible with US ratification the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Lastly, this proposal would be a partial step for the Soviets towards achieving their goals of reducing American forward based systems in Europe and eliminating a German nuclear threat.¹⁴ These were Soviet goals in MBFR as noted in chapter 1.

The tactical nuclear weapon issue will have moved out of the non-negotiable area between SALT and MBFR which was described in chapter 1, if this proposal is tabled in the MBFR negotiations.

The preceding pages have analyzed the advantages of the missile elimination proposal. In that process, some of the disadvantages have surfaced. It is now necessary to deal with these disadvantages in more detail.

Disadvantages

The most critical disadvantage is that this proposal has done nothing to raise the nuclear - non-nuclear threshold. Quite the opposite may be said to be true. By providing a partial threshold between conventional hostilities and strategic nuclear exchanges, it might be argued that the nuclear threshold has been lowered. Knowing that there is a partial

threshold above the nuclear - non-nuclear one, there may be an increased incentive to engage in "low" intensity tactical nuclear war. This is a distinct problem which was inherent in the "short war" strategy discussed in chapter 2 and which has not been resolved. This might work in direct conflict with the short war strategy advocates. If an additional threshold was in existence, it might be argued that there was less need for conventional forces (except artillery) and that hostilities in Europe would be characterized by attacks by fire on the adversary's artillery units, and not by ground attacks. If this analysis is correct, then the situation may be said to have nearly gone full circle back to the situation which existed in the early 1950's. However, this argument is not convincing for it is difficult to imagine either side being willing to have that happen.

The severity of the escalation which would result if one uses his homeland based strategic forces to fill in the geographic void is also a large problem, which was mentioned earlier. There is, of course, the intermediate step of using long range aircraft to fill the void between artillery and strategic systems and thus provide an intermediate escalatory step. But it is here that the geographic asymmetries of Europe become important. The distances between the East - West German border going East to the Soviet Union are much greater than going West to the English Channel or the Atlantic Ocean. These asymmetries would be very important to the United States' 5/

NATO allies. The amount of reassurance that they would have in the retention of their SLBM and bomber forces would be critical here.

The Soviet Union places more of her tactical nuclear capability in missiles (see appendix 1) and is very dependent upon them in a tactical nuclear conflict. "The missile troops have become the basic means for the employment of nuclear weapons in combined arms combat."¹⁵ It would thus appear that the USSR would be unwilling to give up all of her tactical nuclear missiles for fear of being placed in a position of relative inferiority. This is where the defense in depth concept mentioned earlier would be important. This may be a severe stumbling bloc in negotiating an agreement on the proposal under analysis. NATO would probably be asked to give up some other type of weapons system. This also would be difficult to sell to the NATO countries.

Selling the idea of France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany giving up part of their tactical nuclear capability would also be very difficult. This would be especially true of the French who are working toward an autonomous nuclear force with its own utilization doctrine.¹⁶ This difficulty might be compounded by the increased US control over targeting doctrine and release procedures. This could raise in the NATO allies' minds all of the problems that they found with the multi-lateral force concept and thus cause them to veto the proposal.

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An additional problem would be the "sunk costs" of both sides. It would take a great deal of persuasion to convince politicians to simply write off as a bad experience all of the monies which have been spent for missile delivery systems. The missile forces of all countries involved, when coupled with the relevant manufacturers, might be a very difficult lobby to overcome.

The final issue which would have to be resolved is the question of inspection and verification. National technical means of verification were the way around this potential stumbling bloc in SALT I. Given no attempts at camouflage, it should be possible to detect the presence of missile weapon systems.¹⁷ Given the air-transportability of systems such as LANCE, it would be possible to quickly correct any imbalance which might result from a Soviet violation of the agreement. As noted earlier, it should also be possible to determine the type of delivery system used in a nuclear attack and this should reduce the incentive for a side to not abide by an agreement.

This proposal thus has many of the inter and intra-bloc problems which were seen in chapter 1 with respect to MBFR on a whole.

Conclusion

When coupled with a short war strategy, this proposal does provide for increased conflict control and conflict termination possibilities and thus helps to obscure, but not

eliminate the problems which were seen in the discussion of a short war strategy for Europe in chapter 2. Neither alone is sufficient and the combination of the two still leaves some problems of avoiding the first nuclear exchange. Possibly the only means of making a nuclear exchange 100% impossible is to totally eliminate nuclear weapons from national armories. This is totally impracticable in todays world, though agreement on this proposal would be a faltering first step.

The preceding discussion illustrates that Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe have been and continue to be an issue which is considered in both MBFR and SALT. They could be considered to be the linkage between the two. It would appear that MBFR is a better forum for dealing with these weapon systems, as it has a larger number of participants.

The preceding three chapters have partially illustrated the complexity of the issues surrounding the defense of Europe and the interrelationship of nuclear weapons with that defense. It has also illustrated that by changing one or more of the variables of the defense/deterrence equation that there may be changes in all of the other variables.

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End Notes

1. Jeffrey Record, "To Nuke or Not to Nuke: A Critique of Rationales for a Tactical Nuclear Defense of Europe," Military Review, Oct. 1974, p. 3. Record is arguing against the rationale presented in this quote.
2. This proposal is being considered in response to those analysts who are making the argument outlined in the opening quote of the chapter. Specifically the first part of the quote is what I am reacting against. The second part which references conventional defense has been dealt with in chapter 2. For examples of analysts who are calling for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in defense of Europe, the reader should use: LTC J.F. Santilli, Jr., USA, "NATO Strategy Updated: A First Use Policy," Military Review, March 1974; Colin S. Gray, "The Nuclear Connection," Military Review, Sept. 1974; Robert E. Kuenne, "Our Military Posture in Europe," The Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1974, p. 16; Lawrence Martin, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Europe," Survival, Nov.-Dec. 1974; W. Joshua, "A Strategic Concept for the Defense of Europe." Orbis, Vol. XVII, Summer 1973, pp. 448-462.
3. Wolfgang Heisenberg in "The Alliance and Europe: Part: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons," Aledphi Paper, Number 96, Summer 1973, pp. 33-34, makes a similar proposal. His proposal is for a nuclear free zone which would eliminate the aircraft problem, noted later, and which assumes other delivery means are obsolete. On the definition of strategic weapons, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, The Story of SALT, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N.Y., 1973), pp. 174-176.
4. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1959), p. 323. It should be noted that Brodie has changed his mind on the tactical nuclear defense of Europe several times. For example, see his Escalation and the Nuclear Option and "What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe," The Reporter, 23 May 1963.
5. Robert McNamara, Hearings, US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Congress First Session, Part I, Superintendent of Documents, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 102.
6. Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control," Adelphi Paper, Number 88, June 1972, pp. 15-22.

7. A range reduction on aircraft was not part of my proposal because of the potential other theatre uses for which the US and USSR must be prepared. Additionally it is not seen as internally politically viable for either side to scrap its existing air fleets. In this regard the Soviets have just begun deployment of the "Backfire," a new long-range supersonic bomber. "Russia Deploying Supersonic Bomber," The Kansas City Times, Wednesday, 22 Jan. 1975, p. 11A.
8. For a discussion of counterforce and counter value strategies in Europe, see Albert Wohstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era," Orbis, Winter 1974, pp. 1119-1138. Also see Wolfgang Heisenberg, op. cit., pp. 5-27.
9. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, "Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975," Superintendent of Documents, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 4 March 1974), pp. 35-42.
10. J.A. Laestelic, "Ford Back with Arms Agreement," The Kansas City Times, 25 Nov. 1974, p. 1. It is interesting that "Backfire" (mentioned in footnote 7) may or may not fall under the 2,400 ceiling. This will certainly be an issue in the SALT which begin at the end of January.
11. A definition of strategic in this type of context is a difficult one. For these purposes the definition of strategic which is used relates to the size and range of a weapons system as used in SALT I. In SALT I it was agreed to deal with SLBM's and ICBM's. Manned Bombers were not dealt with. This was partially a result of the Soviet definition of strategic (footnoted below) and its interaction with the US FBS in Europe. Thus, as noted in chapter 1, tactical nuclear weapons were in a no-negotiations land between MBFR and SALT. For a discussion cf this see: John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, N.Y., 1973), p. 177-188.
12. In SALT the Soviets initially defined a strategic weapons system as any system which could be delivered onto the homeland of the other. This was unacceptable to the US as it would have included her carrier based aircraft and the forward based systems in Europe. For a discussion of this see: John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, ibid., pp. 174-176.
13. Jeffrey Record and R.I. Lawrence, US Force Structure in NATO, an Alternative, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1974, chapter 2.
14. For a discussion of this see chapter 1 "Motives", p. 6.

15. A.A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), Moscow 1970, Translated and Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, Superintendent of Documents (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), p. 43.
16. For a brief discussion of France and NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, see: John Newhouse, et al., US Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs and Choices, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1971, pp. 90-92. The French Silo based weapons mentioned in "France and Its Defense Organization," RB 550-1, USACGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Jan. 1974, p. 10-1 - 10-4, would also be a very difficult issue to solve.
17. Ted Greenwood, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control," Adelphi Paper, Number 88, June 1972, chapter 3.
18. The Military Balance, 1973-1974 IISS, 1973, pp. 69, 70 and 72.

Appendix 1: European Based Nuclear Delivery Vehicles¹⁸

EUROPEAN BASED NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES,
COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS AND CHARACTERISTICS

United States and Soviet Union

Missiles and Artillery

United States					
Category	Type	Max range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	First deployed	Number deployed (July 1973)
IRBM					
MRBM					
SRBM	MGM-29A Sergeant MGM-31A Pershing	85 450	KT range KT range	1962 1962	(500) (250)
Long range cruise missiles					
Unguided rockets	MGR-1B Honest John	25	KT range	1953	n.a.

Missiles and Artillery

Soviet Union					
Category	Type	Max range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	First deployed	Number deployed (July 1973)
IRBM	SS-5 Skean	2,300	1 MT	1961	100
MRBM	SS-4 Sandal	1,200	1 MT	1959	500
SRBM	SS-1b Scud A SS-1c Scud B SS-12 Scaleboard	50 185 500	KT range KT range MT range	1957 1965 1969	(300)
Long range cruise missiles	SS-N-3 Shaddock	450	KT range	1962	(100)
Unguided rockets	FROG 1-7	10-45	KT range	1957-65	(600)

Missiles and Artillery

NATO (excluding USA)						
Category	Type	Operated by	Max range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	First deployed	Number deployed (July 1973)
IRBM	SSBS S-2	FR	1,875	150 KT	1971	18
SRBM	MGM-29A Sergeant MGM-31A	GE	85	KT range	1962	19
Unguided rockets	MGR-1B Honest John	GE	450	KT range	1962	72
SLBM	UGM-27C Polaris A3 MSBS M-1	BR FR	2,880 1,380	3x200 KT 500 KT	1967 1972	64 32
Self-propelled	M-110 203mm (8in) how M-109 155mm how	NATO	10	KT range	1962	n.a.
Towed	M-115 203mm (8in) how	NATO	10	2 KT	1964	n.a.

Missiles and Artillery

Warsaw Pact (excluding USSR)						
Category	Type	Operated by	Max range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	First deployed	Number deployed (July 1973)
IRBM						
SRBM	SS-1b Scud A SS-1c	BU CZ EG	50 185	KT range KT range	1957 1965	n.a. n.a.
Unguided rockets	FROG 1-7	All	10-45	KT range	1957-65	n.a.

United States						
	Category	Type	Max range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	First deployed	Number deployed (July 1973)
Artillery	Self-propelled	M-110 203mm (8in) how M-109 155mm how	10 10	KT range 2 KT	1962 1964	102 306
	Towed	M-115 203mm (8in) how	10	KT range	1950s	n.a.
n.a.=not available						
Soviet Union						
	Category	Type	Max range (statute miles)	Estimated warhead yield	First deployed	Number deployed (July 1973)
Artillery	Self-propelled					
	Towed	M-55 203mm gun/how	18	KT range	1950s	n.a.

Chapter 4

FORWARD DEFENSE SHORT WAR, AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY'S GROUND TACTICAL FORCES

Many have yet to learn that in the event of a collision in Europe, our peoples would be destroyed by tactical nuclear weapons every bit as efficiently as by strategic bombs, and that, furthermore, the fact of their existence scarcely reduces the risk of the outbreak of war at all.

In chapter 2 the issue of a forward - short war strategy was presented and analyzed in the abstract. The principle problem addressed in that chapter was the issue of preventing or limiting the use of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. This is a major concern of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as the above statement by Chancellor Schmidt illustrates. This chapter will look at the causes of the defense reorganization, which is occurring in the FRG, the resulting force composition changes and the new tactical doctrine which is being promulgated. This will be done so as to further illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of a short war strategy. Additionally, it is hoped that some conclusions can be reached as to the applicability of the force structure and tactics for the United States.

Reasons for the New Force Structure and Tactics

In March, 1969, the former FRG Chief of the Army, LTG Schnez ordered that a new series of tactical doctrine be developed to replace the then existing doctrinal documents known

as TF 62. This was completed in November, 1973 with the issue of the new manual HDv 100/100.² In introducing this new doctrine Colonel Hackenbuecher, the chairman of the FRG Army Study Group, explained the major reasons for the change as follows:³

I. The TF 62 was developed with the military strategic concept of "massive retaliation" and proceeded from the assumption that once a defensive posture had been taken nuclear weapons would be released in large numbers. Accordingly, the TF 62 deals primarily with nuclear operations, while conventional operations are treated more or less as exceptions. The primarily nuclear minded TF 62 in large parts is outdated since the strategic concept of "flexible response" leaves it open whether a nuclear weapon will be released at all and if so when, against which targets, and to what extent. Even if nuclear weapons should be used in the future, it is rather certain that they will not be released so generously, as the TF 62 had it foreseen as a pre-requisite for its operation principles. For this reason alone a new operations manual was badly needed.

II. But also the structure and the equipment have changed since then. Let us point out just a few:

a. The Territorial Army, whose mission was not even mentioned in the TF 62, has been incorporated with the Army in the field.

b. The TF 62 proceeded from the position that all troops were mechanized. Today we have rifle brigades and home defense commands, that cannot conduct operations with the degree of mobility as called for in the TF 62.

c. The utilization of air mobility has gained greater significance through the addition of cargo helicopters than was foreseen in the TF 62. In addition, we will have antitank helicopters in the not too distant future. The old TF understandably could not mention them.

d. The development of new materiel, especially in electronics, has made impetuous progress and makes itself felt more and more in military operations.

III. Not only these changes of strategy, structure, and technology made it more and more desirable to revise the TF 62; but also the many tactical experiences which had been made with the TF 62 since then during all kinds of exercises on a national level and in cooperation with NATO Forces, as

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well as the lessons learnt from the military conflicts of recent years, demanded at least a modification of some of the operation principles of TF 62 -- because it either did not stand the test in the field or it was not applied as the authors of the TF 62 had imagined it.

IV. Finally, following the trend of time man's outlook, his language, and expressive ways have changed: they have become more barren and factual. What still means something to us, the older generation, and the words with which we would like to pass on our thoughts, feelings, and our experiences, are often not discerned or perhaps even misunderstood by the younger generation. However, this was not the decisive reason for a revision, yet was well taken into consideration.

It should be noted that Colonel Hackenbacher's remarks on the reasons for the new tactical doctrine reflect the previously noted FRG sentiment that nuclear defense of her land is not desireable.⁴ This accurately reflects the view of those advocates who are espousing a short war strategy, as noted in chapter 2.

In addition to Colonel Hackenbacher's list of causes for the adoption of a new tactical doctrine, other causes have been given for the organizational changes which are now taking place. These include:

1. The belief that the existing force structure did not meet the requirements of the NATO strategy.
 2. Some elements of the existing structure were not cost effective or were becoming too expensive to maintain in their current status.
 3. Weapons technology has advanced.
 4. The perceived need to maintain a conscript army with the draftee being on active duty for 15 months.
 5. A need to increase the number of units which are available to go upon mobilization or the commencement of hostilities.
 6. The tooth-to-tail ratio was not desireable.
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7. Anti-tank and air defense capabilities were perceived to be limited viv-a-vis the Warsaw Pact threat
8. The need for armored forces to cover the border and the requisite mobility to be able to concentrate at a decisive point.⁶


It can thus be concluded that changes in the strategic situation coupled with perceived weaknesses caused the FRG to adopt a new tactical doctrine and to restructure its forces so as to be able to implement that doctrine. In other words, some of the same considerations which caused Canby and Komer⁷ to advocate a short war strategy for Europe caused the Germans to make some fairly significant changes.

The following pages of this chapter will deal with the new ground force organization and the tactical doctrine which these forces will follow in case of conflict in the Central European theater.


The New Federal Republic of Germany's Organization

The following diagrams show the new command structure of the FRG Army and two types of brigades - Armored Infantry and Armored. Several points should be noted. Each General Command - corps equivalent - has its own organic airborne brigade and controls the home defense group and military region command in its area (more on these later). In the armored infantry brigade, the number of infantrymen and vehicles will be reduced.⁸ Simultaneously, the number of tank battalions will be increased by one with a resulting addition of 12 tanks. In the armored brigade there will be a reduction in the size of the Infantry Battalion with a corresponding addition of 11 1 tank battalion, but a reduction of 9 tanks.⁹


The new command structure of the Army (model)



Model for Army brigades structure of the 80s ARMOURED BRIGADE



Model for Army brigades structure of the 80s ARMOURED INFANTRY BRIGADE



Discussion of Force Structure

The airborne brigades noted above are being structured as anti-tank brigades. These brigades would be infantry armed with "an enormous anti-tank fire capability,"¹⁰ and would be airlifted to reinforce the defense at a critical point. This gives the General Command Commander a highly mobile (until it is on the ground) reaction force to contain any penetration.

The removal of the field replacement battalion in the armored brigade means that it will be ready to go on order. This will not be the case with the armored infantry brigade. This cadre strength battalion problem has been solved by a new principle called "stand-by-readiness". This means that the minister of defense will have the authority to call up 30 to 60,000 soldiers without the approval by the cabinet, the parliament or NATO. Some combat service support elements will be in a similar status. These cadre units are to be prepared to fight "within a few days".¹¹ This proposal reduces some of the problems of mobilization which are inherent in coalition warfare and which were briefly noted in chapter 2.¹²

The number of armored units has been increased while the size of the units has been reduced. This means that a tank company now consists of 10 tanks (3 per platoon and 1 in the company headquarters). This reduces the span of control of the platoon leader and is compatible with the brief training time available to the conscript who is only on active duty for 15 months. The company and battalion have also had their admin./logistics side cut so that their commanders are more

concerned with training and fighting.¹³ It is at Brigade where one first really finds service support elements.

The eleven divisions will each have an Armored Cavalry Regiment of 66 tanks and 36 armored reconnaissance vehicles, which is the equivalent of almost another Brigade. This gives the Division the capability of using this unit in an economy of force role or for other typical cavalry missions.¹⁴

The armored infantry battalion and the engineer company at Brigade have mine dispensing systems organic to them. These are probably designed to enplace the Pandora and Medusa anti-tank mines.¹⁵ This greatly increases the anti-tank defensive capability of the Brigade and its subordinate units. (This capability will be discussed again when dealing with the defensive tactics.)

The final point with regards to the defense reorganization is the upgrading of the Home Defense Groups and the Military Region Commands. These elements are to be better trained and equipped so as to provide defense against airborne attacks.¹⁶ They will have organic anti-tank destroyers and weapons. They will also have organic artillery and a mine laying capability. These elements will provide defense in depth, critical area defense and combat service support. They potentially could also be used for stopping penetrations or for constructing in depth defensive positions. These elements when upgraded should provide to the regular units the freedom to concentrate on their adversary to the east. They also should provide the additional logistic support which will be required on the modern battlefield

In short, the territorial forces will add tremendous depth to the battlefield. Their existence will supplement the regular forces and may provide a means for dealing with some of the problems in the defensive doctrine, which will be discussed next.

The force structure reorganization, which the FRG is undertaking, seems to be the implementation of a short war strategy. The tooth-to-tail ratio is being improved. Forces are being created which should be better able to repulse or contain any Warsaw Pact attack. These forces are being oriented for a short amount of warning time and to provide defense in depth. All of these factors seem to point in the direction of the adoption of a short war strategy by the FRG. In the following section on the new tactical doctrine, it will also be noted that the FRG is going to a forward defense that aims at denying the Warsaw Pact any territorial gains in an attack. This also is compatible with a short war strategy.

The New Defensive Doctrine

For the purpose of this analysis, the focus will be on the defensive tactics that the FRG plans on using to protect its territory.¹⁷ This analysis will be conducted in three parts. Part one will state what appear to be some general principles of the defense. Part two will deal with the implementation of these principles at the battalion level.¹⁸ Part three will be a critique of what has been presented in parts one and two.

General Principles of the Defense: Part I

Defense has as its purpose the protection of a certain area against all attacks and thus the prevention of enemy penetrations into that region which is to be protected. The important thing here is to smash, if possible, strong enemy forces and thus to break or severely reduce his offensive strength.

The area which a unit is assigned to defend is its defense area. The unit must prevent the enemy from penetrating in any depth beyond its defense area using all of the means at its command.

It is always important to stop the enemy's attack forward, before he has reached the defense sector or in the latter's forward portion. Here, the destruction of enemy tanks is of decisive importance.

The attacker has the initiative. He makes the determination as to when and where he attacks. The defender, however, is not confined to just waiting for an attack; he should act in an inspired and resolute manner by skillfully shifting the point of the enemy main effort.

The defense gains its strength from the selection and proper utilization of the terrain—the effect is primarily on fire, but also on movement through which the unit can skillfully and in a versatile way bring its fire and its punch to bear.

AT defenses must be echeloned in depth and use all existing tank obstacles. Enemy tank attacks must be channelized through the use of obstacles, especially mine-fields, and thus guided into preselected areas where armored units or AT weapons can be effective.

The defense requires primarily that terrain be held. Unit elements must attack or engage in delaying actions so as to seize every possible advantage that can be gained from mobile, often see-saw fighting.

Any relinquishment of preselected terrain without a compelling reason is contrary to the essence of defense. However, the unit commander may employ a portion of his unit in delaying actions within his defense sector if he hopes to force the pursuing enemy units into an unfavorable situation or area where they can be smashed by fire or a surprise counterattack.

Counter attacks are a practical means for eliminating enemy elements. All commanders must bring about such possibilities and then take advantage of them if there is a chance that:

- (1) Enemy units , which have been pinned down by defensive fire, can be destroyed by a counterattack before they are reinforced and before their fire support can once again be fully brought to bear or
- (2) Enemy elements , which have crossed an obstacle, can be fought to a standstill while the bulk of the enemy forces are still crossing the obstacle, or
- (3) the advanced enemy elements can be attacked on their flanks or in the rear and can thus be cut off from their own following and supporting echelons.

Counterattacks are mandatory when there is a deep penetration and a coherent defense cannot be maintained or restored by any other means. This is also the case when lost terrain must be recaptured.

Units in positions will orient their defense toward the main combat direction; but because they often may not have units on their flanks, they must be prepared to defend themselves along their flanks and in their rear. Combat units and combat support units must work together and coordinate their operations in this situation.

Positions must be held. They can be abandoned only as a result of orders from the commander who designated that particular position; this decision will be made only if the position is no longer of decisive significance to the defense or if the defense can be continued elsewhere under more favorable conditions.

These principles illustrate a basic philosophy which the FRG has adopted. This philosophy is one of forward defense where a unit is not allowed to permit the enemy to penetrate through the defensive position. This defensive position is organized in depth well forward. As part of this philosophy it appears that the Germans are willing to accept encirclement of units and expect an encircled unit to continue to fight. The philosophy embedded in these principles is also one of mobility and offensive action. Counterattacks in front of and within the battle area are to be conducted by any sized unit. Some of these counterattacks appear to be different from a US

doctrinal counterattack to achieve an objective and restore the battle area. They are more in the nature of tank sweeps (another term that might apply to these attacks is foray) which it is hoped will disorganize, confuse and attrite an aggressor force. It also appears that hasty obstacles - especially mines - will be used to supplement this defense.

With these principles in mind, it will now be useful to see how they are applied by a battalion sized force.

The Battalion in the Defense: Part II

For the purpose of this analysis a reinforced armored battalion will be used. This battalion will be organized as follows:²⁰


Armored Battalion

- 3 Armor Companies - 30 tanks (10/co)
- 1 Infantry Company - 10 MICVs
- 1 Anti-tank Platoon
- 1 Mortar Platoon (6 tubes) (organic)

(For the purpose of this analysis, terrain considerations will not be included. It is necessary for the reader to remember the emphasis placed on terrain in the general principles presented earlier. This emphasis occurs at all levels and it is, of course, obvious that terrain considerations will have an impact on the actual deployment of forces.)

This battalion will occupy a security line up to three kilometers (KM) in front of the FEBA. (Brigade security forces are up to 10 KM in front of the FEBA.) The battalion's security force may consist of up to 25% of the battalion's assets. This force has the normal combat outpost (COP) missions. But it has the additional missions of engaging the enemy and causing him

to deploy and thus beginning his defeat before he reaches the FEBA. This will be accomplished by classic delaying tactics of long range engagement, movement to successive and alternate delay positions, and the use of obstacles. It is also implied, though not stated explicitly, that platoon sized counterattacks (tank sweeps or forays) might be utilized. (This is explicitly covered in the discussion of the tank battalion in the delaying action and there does not seem to be any reason that it could not also apply to a company sized element. At no point does the manual say that the security force is to avoid decisive engagement, though that is implied. This is of some importance when comparing US tactics with those of the FRG.) These would occur in the following manner. As an element was withdrawing its adjacent tank element would attack the flank of the pursuing force. This it would seem could only occur if the security force had a reserve or if the adjacent element was not engaged. These two possibilities might be pictured as follows:



As unit number 2 is forced out of its position, either the unit in position 1 or 3 would prepare to counterattack the unit putting pressure on unit 2. In this example, the units would then occupy their second delay positions. This counterattac

could also be accomplished by the reserve, as mentioned, or the reserve could move and occupy position 1 and the force that was there could revert to reserve.

Once the security force has been forced back to the FEBA, it is integrated into the Battalion defense. This battalion defense, as was the security operation, is typified by audacity and mobility. The battalion will defend an area which is 5 KM wide and 5 KM deep.²¹ The defense of the battalion sector envisions three companies forward with a reserve of only one or two platoons. The battalion assigns the company primary, alternate and supplementary positions. It should be pointed out that these positions are the primary control means which are used. The Germans do not use boundaries between units within a battalion.²² (This may make coordination between units difficult.) It also reinforces the terrain with obstacles. (This reinforcement of the terrain with obstacles seems to be down played if one considers the capability that the battalion has for the creation of hasty obstacles, as was discussed earlier.) This assignment of positions is done to add depth to the battle area. The battalion will utilize the anti-tank platoons either across the entire front or it may form an anti-tank strong point. In either role, it is assigned an axis or direction along which it is to orient its fires. The infantry company can either be assigned suitable terrain to defend or it may be attached to tank companies. In either case the goal is to free the tanks to fight their defense in a mobile manner. In this regard each tank within a unit is assigned a direction

in which it is to defend. The tanks either singly or as a unit are to fight from or move from concealed positions. (This utilizes to the maximum extent possible the mobility of the tank.)

Fight by using their mobility from changing positions, either partially concealed or hidden, with a main battle direction for each one.²⁸

(It should be noted that a company cannot move out of the position assigned without the approval of the battalion commander. He is, however, free to move his elements anywhere he desires within his position which may be 2000 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.)

In the process of this mobile combat along the battalion front, it is anticipated that enemy flanks will become exposed either as a result of a unit moving back to an alternate position or as a result of the fluidity of the situation. In either case the battalion will seize this opportunity to attack and conduct counterattacks (probably tank sweeps or forays) by the reserve so as to further attrite, confuse, disorganize and ultimately defeat the attacker. The reserve can also be used to reinforce forward elements or to intercept enemy elements which have penetrated.

The armored infantry battalion defense is similar to the tank battalion defense. Mobility is still used to the largest extent possible. In some cases the infantry may be dug in while their armored carriers move around the battlefield engaging the enemy with their weapons.

Analysis of the Tactics: Part III

The previous discussion illustrates that the Germans ^{XV}

are preparing to fight a defense which is characterized by audacity and mobility. It would appear that they plan on increasing their combat power in a given area by using the mobility which is inherent in armored vehicles. This constant movement will allow them to deal with more than one enemy element with one of their elements. This constant movement may, however, create some problems.

Constant movement of elements on the battlefield may make command and control very difficult. As was noted, they use directions of approach and positions as control measures. It is not too difficult to imagine a situation where, as a result of two adjacent elements having moved within their position, gaps will result which may afford the enemy the opportunity to move small elements through undetected. (Gaps are supposed to be observed, but during the "heat of battle" this may not always be the case.) If this occurs, the battalion reserves may not be available to counter this infiltration. This could create havoc in the battalion rear and might cause the brigade to have to commit it's reserve piecemeal. This would be the case if similar infiltrations occurred elsewhere in the brigade sector. This infiltration could result in units becoming isolated. The Germans seem willing to accept this. The fact that there is little combat service support forward may severely restrict the ability of the isolated unit to continue its resistance, unless critical supply items have been prestocked. Another option is to counterattack to restore the coherence of the defense. If a brigade has committed its reserves piecemeal to ¹² block the forces which have successfully penetrated an infiltration.

through the defense the requisite reserves may not be available to counterattack.

The manual does not address the use of suppressive fire or smoke during this mobile combat. It is thus not known whether these measures will be used. If the Germans do not plan on using them, they will probably discover that they may be necessary on their mobile battlefield so as to allow them to move.²⁴

This defensive concept would appear to be compatible with nuclear warfare. Large reserves are not maintained and thus they are not lucrative targets for nuclear weapons. The movement aspect of the defense coupled with the airborne (anti-tank) brigade at Corps level should allow the Germans to react to any adverse condition which may result from the Pact's utilization of nuclear weapons. The defense in depth created by the territorial forces also fits in well with defense on a nuclear battlefield. In short, while preparing to fight on a non-nuclear battlefield, the Germans appear to have achieved the dispersion and depth to defend when nuclear weapons are used.

This mobility on the battlefield may also reduce one of the advantages of the defender -- the use of terrain as a combat power multiplier. In spite of the German belief that they will fight from the "partially concealed or hidden" positions noted early, it is easy to imagine situations where the Germans will expose themselves unnecessarily in the process of moving from position to position. If they are hidden while moving, they are incapable of fighting on the move. This may reduce the combat multiplier effect which was seen as resulting from


their use of mobility. In other words by fighting in a mobile way they may be reducing their firepower which is engaging the enemy at any given time. On the other hand, by careful use of smoke and suppressive fire to accompany movement, they may achieve the ability to mass against a threat, while suppressing minor threats, and after having dealt with the primary threat, turn their attention to other threats. This will take superb command and control, but if effective, will allow for defense on wide frontages.

The Germans talk of forward defense in depth. But as noted earlier, the depth is achieved by the use of each unit having alternate positions, not by having larger reserve units deployed behind the committed units. The Home Defense Groups' and Military Region Commands' assets do provide depth to the battlefield, but this depth does not begin until one reaches the rear of the corps or division. It would thus appear that by not accepting encirclement that the Germans could add depth to the battlefield as they would have forces available to occupy alternate positions. This presents a dilemma. The Germans seem to feel that if the terrain was worth defending, it is worth retaining and thus the best way to do this is by holding it. However, by holding this terrain, they may reduce the combat power available to defend in depth and also allow main units to be dealt with by the Pact's second or third echelon.

As noted earlier, lip service is payed to the creation of obstacles -- especially minefields. This seems unusual when one considers the minefield laying assets which are available.

The large scale use of this capability may provide the ability to contain the aggressor infiltrated or penetrating units and as such gain the reaction time necessary for the battalion to move units from their primary positions in order to deal with this threat. Referring back to the initial battalion sector, this might happen in the following way.

The Battalion might be deployed in the following manner:



In the above situation the enemy has infiltrated or penetrated between positions 1 and 2. The reserve has been used to reinforce position 4. It is at this time that someone discovers the enemy. The battalion could then use its mine laying capability (with a short armed time) to stop the enemy force and to seal the area from which the enemy came. Simultaneously the platoon on position ^a could counterattack and then move to position 2A and revert to the reserve while either the reserve or elements from position 3 occupy position 2. It would also be possible for the battalion to occupy its alternate positions.

This of course would be giving up its forward positions which may not be desirable based on the doctrine. The critical point to be made here is the use of the hasty mine laying capability to slow, disorganize and attrite the enemy so as to create reaction time. This would allow the Germans to exploit their mobility and mine laying capability. They may even want to create killing zones similar to this so as to defeat certain enemy forces in detail. This would take detailed planning and due to the inherent risks may not be desirable.

The above analysis is not be argue that the Germans may not be planning to defend in the manner depicted. This is said because it is somewhat difficult to discuss the defense without having a particular piece of terrain to defend against a given threat force. With regards to the perceived downplaying of the mine laying capability, it may be that it is explained and integrated into the defense in other documents which are not available. This is probably the case since LTG Schulz did specifically mention the capability. None of this, however, detracts from the previous comments about the tactics. It only means that some of the critiques presented may have been addresse by the Germans.

In conclusion the German concept of defense is highly mobile and audacious. There is a certain attractiveness in the use of the mobility of the tracked vehicles. This use of mobility should create confusion on the enemy's part and slow his momentum because he will not know where the next attack may

P1

come from. It also should increase their combat power by creating a force which is highly reactive and which is prepared by training and doctrine to mass against the enemy and then disperse to meet the next attack when and where it comes.

Conclusion

The early and rapid mobilization, the forward defense which refuses to give up terrain, and a high tooth-to-tail ratio all reinforce the concept that the Federal Republic of Germany has adopted a short war strategy. The discussion of their tactics leads one to believe that they plan on thwarting the enemy's efforts early and forcing him to either escalate or take a non-military means for conflict termination. (For a discussion of this, see chapter 2.)

The Bundeswehr and USAREUR

The foregoing discussion raises some considerations which the United States Army should reflect upon in its analysis of the defense of Central Europe. These will be presented, but not analyzed in depth, at this point.

With the FRG fighting a forward defense which does not plan upon giving up terrain, careful coordination between her forces and those of her allies will be necessary so as to ensure that gaps do not develop. If the US is delaying in order to gain time while CONUS based forces are being airlifted to Europe and the Germans are defending forward, the distinct possibility exists that gaps will be created. This needs to be coordinated from the theater level down to battalion level.

The German hasty mine laying capability is another capability that the US Army should examine in some detail. It would appear to be a capability which would increase the combat power of a battalion and make it more capable of defending for a longer period against a Pact onslaught.

Integration of the territorial army and the capabilities which it offers should be considered by American war planners. Since the territorial army is designed to operate throughout Germany, it may provide some rear area activities such as traffic control, engineer support, and rear area security (among others) which would allow the United States to increase her tooth-to-tail ratio.

The German defense reorganization with its emphasis on armored forces may offer the United States something in this era of high manpower costs. By placing some infantry units in the reserve and filling those positions with tank units, it would be possible to increase the anti-tank capability needed to defend against the initial tank onslaught with fewer men. (This was one of the issues in chapter 1 which had to be dealt with.) The concept of standby reserves adopted by the FRG, and recommended by DOD to the Congress, fits very neatly into this concept. This would require an increased level of readiness on the part of the reserves and a change in division organization in order to allow for cadre type infantry units. There are numerous political considerations which are associated with this concept, but it is worthy of consideration.

The final area of consideration is the German tactical doctrine. By adopting a defense which is characterized by mobile combat where audacity and tenaciousness are the by-words, the United States would be moving toward the utilization of small unit initiative. This mobile combat concept might also partially alleviate the problems of defense on extended frontages. This would substitute mobility for the inherent weakness of spreading forces along a front and then tying them to a given sector. The concept of a fighting COP rather than one which only provides early warning is also useful to consider. This would provide depth to the battlefield and allow the commander to exploit his mobility to deal with primary and secondary threats by order of priority by applying economy of force measures in part of his sector while defeating the other threats in mobile warfare. The problem of a potential depreciation of combat power because of its unavailability during movement, noted earlier, needs to be considered before this concept is adopted. As noted earlier, suppressive fires and the use of smoke may slow the attacker and make this rapid movement from threat to threat a more viable defensive concept.

The one thing that the United States must avoid is the application of the German tactical principles to situations and terrain where they are not applicable. In other words, what may work in Europe may not be as applicable to defensive combat in other geographical areas against opponents who are organized differently and fight with different tactics.

Finale

The Federal Republic's organization and tactics seem to be oriented towards winning the first battle of a NATO - Warsaw Pact conventional conflict and thus placing the Pact in a position where they face the dilemma noted in chapter 2. A tenacious forward defense is to be employed which should be difficult to overcome without nuclear weapons. Thus conventional conflict prevention has been increased but conflict control may have been reduced since the Pact may use nuclear weapons early. But, since even "tactical" nuclear war is unacceptable to the FRG, they seem to have adopted the only doctrine and force structure available. They are defending forward and not giving up terrain so as to avoid being nibbled away by a series of small faits accompli. They are also placing the onus on the Pact to utilize nuclear weapons first, and their tactical doctrine is compatible with nuclear warfare.

As has been noted, there are certain aspects of the FRG concept which seem attractive and should be given thorough examination by the United States.

ENDNOTES

1. Helmut Schmidt, Defense or Retaliation (New York, Praeger, 1962), p. 5.
2. Colonel Hackenbucher, (Chairman, Study Group Army), "Introduction to the New Army Operations Series HDv 100/100" (Hamburg, November, 1973), p. 3.
3. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
4. For further discussion on this point, see Dr. Charles N. Davidson's "Tactical Nuclear Defense - The West German View" in Parameters, The Journal of the US Army War College, Vol. IV, No. 1, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, pp. 47-57.
5. German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1973/1974, The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces (Bonn, 14 January 1974), pp. 66-
6. LTG Schulz, (Deputy Chief of Staff of the FRG Army), lecture to USACGSC class 73-74 (date unknown). General Schulz makes several of the points which were also made by Col. Hackenbucher and/or were in the 1973/74 White Paper noted above.
7. See chapter 2 and it's endnotes on Canby and Komer's writings
8. LTG Schulz saw the infantryman as not being very cost effective. See LTG Schulz lecture, op. cit., p. 9.
9. White Paper 1973/74, op. cit., pp. 74, 76-77. There is some conflict on this point as LTG Schulz stated that one battalion would have a standby readiness company, which would bring the total Brigade tank strength to 109. (See LTG Schulz, op. cit., p. 19.) Whether the White Paper 1973/74 or General Schulz is correct is unknown. LTG Schulz also noted an increase of armored Brigades to 17 from the current 13. At the same time the Army is going from 33 to 36 brigades. Exactly what kind of brigade is being eliminated is unknown. It would be possible to form an additional one and a half Brigades out of the tanks available if there are now to be 99 tanks in the brigade. The personnel to man them could be coming from the staff reductions and the elimination and consolidation of some admin/log elements.
10. LTG Schulz, op. cit., p. 11.
11. Ibid., pp. 13-14, and White Paper 73/74, op. cit., pp. 75-79.

12. The problem of mobilization is a multifaceted one. One must identify that his potential opponent is preparing to attack. This may take time. Then he must react by preparing his forces. This may be a very time consuming process due to domestic politic and/or alliance politics. Another problem is how much preparation will the opponent go through before attacking -- will it be days or weeks. Thus it can be seen that there are numerous factors which may prevent the mobilization of NATO's forces in time. The FRG standby readiness posture partially alleviates most of these problems. To be exact the German forces react very early -- sever days -- after mobilization. They then will use their manpower reserves as fill, i.e. once the 36 brigades are at full strength the other trained personnel will be used as replacements. This further illustrates their "short war" thinking.

13. LTG Schulz, op. cit., p. 1.

14. Ibid., p. 20.

15. Stefan Geisenheyner, "A Defensive Weapons for Europe: Pandor Medusa, Dragon Seed" Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, September, 1971), pp. 307-39. The mine dispensing systems can create a minefield which is 400x200 meters in 30 seconds, according to LTG Schulz. (The text of his speech is not clear as to whether one system can do this or that it takes all 12 of them which are in the brigade's engineer company.)

16. LTG Schulz, op. cit., pp. 20-21. The White Paper 1973/74 describes these elements as follows: The Territorial Army is made up of territorial military headquarters and agencies as well as territorial forces. There are three territorial commands and five military district commands with their subordinate commands. The forces of the Territorial Army are assigned to the various commands according to the functions to be performed. The mission of the Territorial Army is:

- to ensure the freedom of manoeuvre of the German Army field forces and of the allied forces,
- to provide rear area security against infiltrated, penetrated or airlanded enemy forces,
- to give logistic support, in co-operation with the BUNDESWEHR Administration and the military medical and health services, to the Army field forces from the available national resources

TERRITORIAL ARMY

as of October 1, 1973

Peacetime strength: 64,000 military personnel

3 territorial commands

5 military district commands

30 military region commands

(including Bremen and Hamburg Garrison Commands)

71 military subregion commands

(including Munich Garrison Headquarters)

and special activities such as denial engineers, regional communication agencies, movement headquarters.

In addition, the Territorial Army includes diverse other territorial forces of various type and strength according to their mission such as:

- 5 home defence groups
(two of which are yet to be activated)
 - 4 service support commands
 - 1 signal brigade
 - 2 signal regiments
 - 2 engineer regiments
- as well as additional units of the
- . signal troops
 - . military police troops
 - . psychological defence troops
 - . JAGER Troops
 - . CBR defence troops (defence against chemical, biological, and radiological weapons)
 - . engineer troops
 - . technical troops
 - . medical troops

17. The defense has been chosen for it is the initial posture that the FRG would most likely adopt and because it is here that there appears to be the most new thinking.

18. The battalion level was chosen as it is manageable and fully illustrates the new thinking.

19. This section comprises a list of principles which were discerned in discussions with COL Gerhardt (FRG LNO at CGSC). The principles presented are not all of those he discussed nor are they presented in the same ^{order} as COL Gerhardt discussed them. The selection of principles and their ordering was an attempt to make some points and to provide some concepts which will be set in part two--the defense of the battalions. There are some points omitted which may be of critical importance to some readers, but were not of major importance to this author.

20. By referring back to the defense reorganization charts, the reader will discern that this battalion has its normal battalion assets plus an infantry company of 10 MICV's from the brigade's armored infantry battalion and a AT platoon from the tank destroyer company. It should be noted that the Germans also envision the tank destroyer company and the armored infantry battalion operating as independent elements without cross attachment. On this subject see Tactical Principles of the Combat Forces for the Operational Command of Battalions and Companies. (FUE H III 2 - File No. 60-15-00) (Bonn, 15 August 1974). All of the details of the battalion defense which is presented have been taken from the above reference and each individual portion will not be referenced except for direct quotes.

21. In the example used, the new battalion organization is utilized. There is some question as to whether the manual (60-15 noted above) is truly applicable to the new organization. This is the case as there are two examples where 5 tanks are depicted. The new organization has only 3 tanks per platoon -- not the present 5. This is important only as it effects the frontages that a given element can defend. It is not known whether the Germans plan on reducing frontages with the reduced size of a battalion. This could probably only be discerned from actual contingency plans, which needless to say are not available.

22. Col. Gerhardt disagrees on this point. He states that the FRG does use boundaries between company sized units, but that for some reason the manual that I used for my data did not show them. He has shown me manuals in German where boundaries are shown between companies.

23. 60-15, op. cit., p. 33.

24. Again Col. Gerhardt disagrees. He points out that the use of suppressive fires and smoke are discussed in other manuals which have not been translated into English. He also notes that if something is mentioned in one manual it very well may not be mentioned in another one. This is the case here. This seems to be a shortcoming in the FRG manual writing technique as it makes it more difficult for outsiders to understand the German concepts completely.

25. Col. Gerhardt disagrees at this point for the same reason noted in end note 24.